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Oscar Vergara, University of Coruña / Spain
 
 
Legal System, Repression and Human Rights in Contemporary Spain 
Some Remarks about Spanish Transition to Democracy 
 
Abstract: As is well known, the 2nd Spanish Republic (1931-1936) was toppled by a military uprising 
which, after a cruel Civil War, set up an autocratic regime led by General Franco which lasted until 
his natural death in 1975. According to the contemporary theory of the legal system, a legal order 
exists on the sole condition that it is efficient in general terms and this was the case for both the 
Republic and the Dictatorship. In turn, the validity of the legal norms of all legal orders is based on its 
respective rules of recognition. Thus, neither the existence of the legal order nor the validity of its 
respective legal norms depends on moral considerations. In this paper, we call this affirmation into 
question  on  the  base  of  the  fact  that  the  compensatory  methods  adopted  from  the  Transition  to 
Democracy show an evident concern to repair the damage of taking away a person’s basic rights (life, 
health, freedom, expression, association etc) although the Spanish Constitution, with its catalogue of 
fundamental rights was not in force at that time. But these measures would not have much sense if, as 
Raz says, there was no shared content which is common to all legal systems. Like Nino, we claim that 
one must discriminate between a democratic legal order and an autocratic one to establish the level of 
validity of its respective legal norms. Thus it can be assigned a presumption of justice to democratic 
norms. Finally, we state that the criteria to weigh up the justice or injustice of legal norms, as that of 
legal orders, takes root in the level of respect they show towards human rights.  
Keywords:  Transitional  Justice.  Human  Rights.  Democracy.  Validity  of  Legal  Norms.  Historical 
Memory. 
 
For years, the Spanish transition to democracy (1975-1982) was seen, both inside and 
outside Spain, as a model. This is still understandable. The Spanish Transition was studied by 
politicians, historians and sociologists on an international level. As Tusell wrote, this was an 
“unexpected”  success,  a  consequence  of  the  lack  of  precedents  and  of  the  enormous 
deadweight  which  Franco’s  regime  signified.
1  His  Regime  perpetuated  along  almost  four 
decades “of peace”.
2 Franco thought it would survive him and he used to say: “todo lo dejo 
atado y bien atado” (I leave everything tied up and well tied up).  
                                                           
 Lecturer at University of Coruña /Spain.  
This work is part of the research project “From Defeat Discourse to Dialogue Discourse. Transitional Justice, 
Historical Memory and Constitution” (SEJ2007-64461), financed by the Spanish Ministry of Education and 
Science for 2007-2010. Thanks to Professor Serna for his interesting suggestions on this work. 
1 Javier Tusell, Transición a la democracia [Transition to Democracy], Madrid, 2007, 20-21. 
2 This is the way of speaking of the Francoist Regime. García de Cortázar points that one should speak of 
“order” rather than “peace” See: Fernando García de Cortázar, Los mitos de la historia de España [Myths on 2 
However, the Transition passed without any breakup, from the legal political reform of 
the Regime by itself. This,  on the other hand, was  complete as  the political  class of the 
Dictatorship did not self perpetuate in the new institutional scene.
3 
In all this, remembering the past had a highly important role. The awareness of danger 
was very present during the Transition. Politicians were very afraid of new fratricidal clashes 
such as those of the thirties. This needed to be avoided at all costs. A specific aspect of the 
Spanish Transition was the need to overcome the division between victors and the defeated 
which had been established after the Civil War, but which started to be abandoned in the last 
years of the Franco regime by its own offspring. 
Largely due to this need to avoid new clashes,
4 the Spanish Transition occurred without 
criminal justice. People tried to look to the future, putting into oblivion all that had happened. 
But “putting into oblivion” is not the same as “forgetting”; it means remembering the past 
with the aim for closure. This is the opposite of amnesia,
5 as it implies investigating the past, 
not trusting anybody's memory, not even one's own.
6 
The Amnesty of 1977 on the other hand, was used to take ETA prisoners (and other left 
wing terrorist groups with violent crimes) out of prison. Political prisoners had already 
previously been granted Amnesty.
7 The Amnesty Act was approved by elected democratic 
Parliament and it was negotiated between the opposition parties and the Governmen t. The 
same Parliament developed and enacted the Constitution of 1978. The Basque Nationalist 
Party probably was the one which defended the need for amnesty with the most insistence.  
In this context, no public places were created for the memory of the def eated nor were 
symbolic and honorary aspects dealt with. But on the other hand, significant economic efforts 
were made. I refer, amongst others, to measures such as the rehabilitation of civil servants of 
the 2
nd Republic; pensions for the disabled, widows and orphans of combatants and other 
servants of the Republic, and compensation for political prisoners. All this to the extent that in 
the last two decades of the 20th century, the number of pensions derived from the Civil War 
was 25% of the total of pensions for the non working classes.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Spanish History], Barcelona, 2004, 328. 
3 On the social and mental transformation which explains this surprising turn, see Tusell (note 1), 38-39. 
4 On other factors, see Alicia Gil,  La justicia de transición en España: De la amnistía a la memoria histórica 
[Transitional Justice in Spain: from amnesty to the Historical Memory], Barcelona, 2009, 137-140. Keep in 
mind for example that most of the Spanish society was in harmony with the Dictatorship for those years and 
even today there are many who refuse to condemn it.  
5 Sometimes the Spanish model has been summarised as “amnesty and amnesia”. 
6 Santos Juliá, De nuestras memorias y de nuestras miserias [On our memories and on our miseries], 7  Hispania 
Nova  (2007),  790,  http://hispanianova.rediris.es,  accesed  November  2010.  In  fact,  the  Civil  War  and  the 
Dictatorship were the object of many historical studies from the start of the Transition.  
7 Ibid., p. 794. 3 
Curiously, the critical debate around the transitional Spanish model was raised, generally 
speaking, by the grandchildren of those who suffered in the Civil War. Thus, from the first 
years of the new century, various parliamentary groups have asked for the cancelation of all 
condemnations dictated for political motives during the Civil War and Dictatorship.
8 These 
demands lead to the creation of an Inter-ministerial Commission which studied this question 
and others which the pro historical memory supporters considered unfinished business: taking 
away Francoist symbols and monuments, granting pensions to the so -called  “Children  of 
War”, improving the Spanish nationality granting system to those belonging to International 
brigades, an engagement of Government in the finding and disinterment of bodies etc. As a 
result of the works of the Commission, the Parliament enacted what was popularly known as 
the “Historical Memory Act” (HMA).
9  
Neither this Act not the afore-mentioned Inter-ministerial Commission ever managed to 
establish the possibility of criminal persecution of crimes committed during the repression of 
the Franco regime. Thus the writ of Judge Garzón 16 October 2008, was quite innovative, as 
it attempted to open a sort of general investigation for crimes committed during the Civil War 
and Francoism by the so-called “national group”.
10 This led to a trial for prevaricación (abuse 
of power) on the base of his lack of venue in conducting this investigation.There are also 
some relevant legal obstacles as the expiring of the crimes, their lack of legal description as 
international crimes when they were committed and the Amnesty Act. 
This paper aims to accomplish two things. Firstly, to offer a panorama of all that has 
been done in Spain to repair the consequences of the Civil War and the Dictatorship with the 
aim of forming a debate on the sufficiency or insufficiency of said measures. And secondly, 
to extract two consequences from the point of view of the Theory of Law: the need for a 
minimum respect for human rights that every legal order must promote and the different 
grades of validity of legal rules depending on their autocratic or democratic origin.  
The structure is the following. Firstly, the traditional theory of the legal system is briefly 
exposed. This theory admits the possibility for legal rules of having any content if they have 
been correctly enacted in the framework of an effective legal system. Next the oppression 
legal system during the Dictatorship is reviewed. Then we look at the theory, defended by 
Nino, that states that non democratic rules have a lower grade of validity. Next, we examine 
                                                           
8 Note than in Germany in 1998 the Law of 25 August cancelled unjust national-socialist sentences in the 
administration of criminal justice.  
9 Law 52/2007, 26 December, whereby rights are recognised and extended and measures are set in favour of 
those who suffered persecution or violence during the Civil War and Dictatorship (HMA).  
10  The analogy of this approach became evident with the Decree of 2 6 April 1940 whereby the Franco 
Government  ordered  the  Supreme  Court  “to  start  a  investigation  whereby  all  the  proof  of  criminal  acts 
committed in the national territory during the Red domination is reunited”.  4 
the various measures of repair accorded during the Transition. Finally, we state the opinion 
that  the  protection  that  such  measures  embody  (life,  health,  freedom  etc,)  highlights  the 
primacy of human rights above the criteria of mere legality and efficacy. We also state that 
formally there is no transition to a new legal order at all, because it does not involve a new 
rule of recognition, but the transformation of the Francoist regime by itself. So the traditional 
theory that legal systems can have any content is put into question.  
 
I. A formal Theory of legal system 
1. Legal order and the legal system  
Nothing is indifferent to time —even humankind’s most fundamental rights are affected in 
some way by it. For instance, the right to education in peacetime is different to that during a 
War (although all children have this right). Even the right to Life can be questioned as regards 
its efficacy in the case of legitimate defence. In general, legal systems change constantly. The 
sole fact of promulgating a new Act determines a new legal system which is different from 
the previous one, not only as it hosts a new rule but because it generates a new set of logical 
relations with the rest of legal regulations that compose the system.
11 This fact generates a 
succession of legal systems over time which is perfectly compatible with the existence of a 
single legal order. Following Alchourrón and Bulygin’s terminology, we can say that a legal 
order is made up of a sequence of legal systems linked by a legality chain.
12 When this chain 
is broken, a new legal order can emerge. For example, the military uprising of July 1936 
involved a new legal order. But, did it the Transition from Francoist Regime to Democracy? 
When does a new legal order exist? The basic criterion among legal theorists is efficacy: 
a legal order exists when it is generally efficient.
13 Hart states this implies two things: citizens 
obey the legal rules and officials accept them rationally as critical common standards of 
official behaviour.
14 For Raz, the authority of legal rules derives from the fact that they are 
enacted by competent organs. This, he believes, turns them into exclusionary reasons for 
action.
15 But is there nothing to say about the content of legal orders?    
                                                           
11 Carlos E. Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin, Sobre la existencia de las normas jurídicas [On the existence of 
legal norms], México, 1997, 73-75. 
12 Carlos E. Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin, Sobre el concepto de orden jurídico [On the concept of the legal 
order], in C. E. Alchourrón and E. Bulygin, Análisis lógico y derecho [Logical Analysis and the Law], Madrid, 
1991, 397. 
13 Oscar Vergara, Epílogo [Epilogue], in  Teorías del sistema jurídico [Theories of Legal System], ed. by Oscar 
Vergara, Granada, 2009, 307-308. 
14 Herbert L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, 1961, 113. For a critical point of view, see Pedro Rivas, El 
sistema jurídico en la teoría del derecho de Hart [The legal system in Hart’s Theory of Law], in Vergara, ed. 
(note 13), 133-137.  
15 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, Oxford, 1999, 142-143. With “exclusionary reason” means that 
when a legal norm is applicable to a case, it must be followed independently of any other moral, economical, 5 
2. The Spanish legal system from 1936 
a) As is well known, on 18 July 1936 a military uprising took place in Spain which, after its 
triumph in the Civil War, led to a new autocratic legal order which lasted until the mid ‘70s. 
This is a clear case of breaking the chain of legality.  
The Decree of 24 July 1936 set up a Junta of National Defence, formed by main military 
authorities  that  took  part  in  the  coup,  “which  assumes  all  the  powers  of  the  State  and 
legitimately represents the country before foreign countries”. This is a Decree which has no 
support in Republican legality. In the second paragraph, the Junta seems to grant itself the 
power  to  dictate  Decrees  and  draft  a  procedure:  “The  Decrees  from  this  Junta  will  be 
promulgated after having been accorded by it and will be authorised with the President’s 
signature and published in this ‘Official Bulletin’.”
16  
As a complement of this norms, the Decree of 1 November 1936, declared all rules set 
after 18 July which had not come from Military Authorities of the Junta of National Defence 
as null and void.  
 
b)  This  topic  has  been  dealt  with  in  the  Legal  Theory.  For  Kelsen,  the  State,  which  he 
identifies with the legal order, has, like God, a vocation of eternity. However, it is a fact that 
States or legal orders succeed after one another. One of the functions of International Law is 
actually to legally articulate this succession. It is thought that a triumphant revolution is a 
condition amongst others, which allows us to speak of the emergence of a new State legal 
order.
17 Kelsen consequently thinks that a legal order exists in its whole when it is efficient 
according to the principle of effectiveness (regardless of legitimate or illegitimate origin). 
“Thus”, he writes, “a State legal order has a beginning and an end in time, like companies, 
associations, cooperatives, corporations etc within this order.”
18 There seems therefore no 
place for the moral question of legitimacy.  
Kelsen writes: a State exists in the sense of the International legal community “when an 
independent power of control is established over people living in a certain territory. In other 
words, when a coercive order of human behaviour —that only has International Law above 
it— acquires real efficacy in a certain scope”.
19 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
religious etc. reasons which can also be applicable.  
16 This refers to the Official Bulletin of the Junta of National Defence in Spain. 
17 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre [General theory of Law], 1925, repr. Vienna, 1993, 148. 
18 Ibid., 148. 
19 Ibid., 127. 6 
In other words, International Law gives a legal character to the effective control. For this, 
the triumphant revolution or the victorious usurper becomes a “legitimate power”.
20 Jhering 
had  already  noticed  this,  pointing  out  that  when  an  Uprising  triumphs,  one  talks  of 
“Revolution”  but,  if  it  fails,  of  “Rebellion”.
21  Naturally,  if  the  new  Revolution  fails,  the 
preceding legal order is maintained with its basic norm as if it had never lost its validity.
22 In 
Kelsen, such power can assume any kind of content. No transcendent value is sought.
23  
 
3. Legal norm and sanction  
For the traditional positivist theory, all legal norms have the structure “hypothesis –  legal 
consequence”, being this a positive or negative sanction. With regard to its nature, the legal 
norm  has  been  traditionally  understood  as  the  sovereign’s  command  guaranteed  by  a 
sanction.
24 But Kelsen does not agree with this opinion and he considers that a legal norm is a 
hypothetical judgment which expresses a logical link (imputation) between a conditioning 
fact and a conditioned consequence: “If it is A, it ought to be B”. For him, this connection 
does not imply any moral or political value.
25 Kelsen considers this “ought to be” as a purely 
formal character in the sense of Kant; he sees no link with a transcendent idea of Law. “It 
remains  applicable whatever the  content of the connected facts  is”.
26 For this  author, the 
legislations of the USSR, of fascist Italy or of democratic-capitalist France are equivalent. All 
are legal orders. Thus he writes: “There is no human behaviour as such human behaviour, 
regarding its content, which is excluded from being the content of a legal norm.”
27 
Raz  refines  this  approach  but  does  not  go  beyond  it.  He  thinks  that  not  all  legal 
regulations  are  coercive.  Coercive  is  the  legal  order  in  its  whole.  In  fact,  he  thinks, 
coerciveness is not logically essential to the Law, although it is humanly impossible to do 
without it, given the way the human beings are.
28 In any case, legal rules have authority and 
are binding if they have been enacted by a competent body.  
 
                                                           
20 Ibid., 127. 
21 Rudolf von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht [Law as a Means to an End], 1904, repr. Hildesheim, 1970, 244. 
22 Hans Kelsen, Théorie pure du droit: Introduction a la science du droit, [Pure Theory of Law, Introduction to 
the science of Law], H. Thévenaz, trans., Neuchatel, 1953, 117-118. 
23 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre [Pure Theory of Law], 2
nd ed., 1960, repr. Vienna, 1992, 223. 
24 Jeremy Bentham,  Of Laws in General, H.L.A. Hart, ed., London, 1970, 93; John Austin, The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined, 1861, repr. Cambridge, 1999, 24-25. 
25 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre [Pure theory of Law], 1
st ed., Vienna, 1934, 23. 
26 Ibid., 24. 
27 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre [Pure Theory of Law], 2
nd ed., 201. 
28 Raz (note 15), 158. On the theme of coerciveness, see José Antonio Seoane  and Pedro Rivas, El último 
eslabón del positivismo jurídico: Dos estudios sobre Joseph Raz [The Last link of Legal Positivism: Two studies 
on Joseph Raz], Granada, 2005, 134-135. 7 
II. Legal system and repression during the Dictatorship 
4. Professed justification  
If what is written above is true, a legal order does not require more legitimacy than that of 
Victory as it can establish a system of coercion which is coherent with the goals it promotes 
(whatever they may be). Nevertheless, if we examine the positivist Spanish Law, one sees it 
aspires to moral legitimisation.  
The Decree of 13 September 1936 states in its Preface: 
For a long time, Spain has been a victim of political actions developed by certain parties which, instead of 
co-operating in the prosperity of the country, satisfied personal ambitions to the detriment of the common good 
[…]. 
This justification falls on its rules. Such a decree declares the illegality of “all parties and 
political and social groups which [...] integrated the so-called Popular Front, as well as the 
political and social associations that were against the forces that work together in the National 
Uprising” (Article 1). Likewise, all assets are seized and they become the property of the 
State (Article 2). It stipulates moreover that public civil servants and workers from companies 
that are granted with a State subvention can be corrected, suspended or dismissed if their 
attitude is considered “anti patriotic or contrary to the national Uprising” (Article 3).  
A “patriotic ideal” is also attributed to those who attempted the failed 1932 coup against 
the  II  Republic.
29  Taking  into  account  their  “bravery,  high  spirit  and  far-seeing  views” 
through  the  Decree  of  13  September  1936,  the  Junta  of  National  Defence  grants  them 
complete Amnesty, including reinstatement, taking into account “the feelings and desires of 
the country”. 
It’s worth mentioning that this appeal to popular legitimacy was shared by the Republic. 
In fact, its Constitution proclaimed in Article 1: “Spain is a democratic Republic of workers 
of all classes, which is organised in a regime of Liberty and Justice” and that “the powers of 
all its organs come from the people.”  
As Alexy has written, each legal order harbours a claim to correctness.
30 
 
5. Re-establishment of the Courts of Honour 
The moral question is essential in the Decree of 17 November 1936 for re-establishing the 
Courts of Honour:  
                                                           
29 We refer to the coup of General Sanjurjo 10 August 1932, for which he was condemned to death. This was 
later changed to life imprisonment. In 1933, he was granted partial amnesty without being able to re-join the 
Army.   
30 Robert Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts [Concept and validity of the Law], Freiburg/München, 1994, 64. 8 
Military institutions fervently worship Honour, source of the high virtues of loyalty and heroism. Hence, 
the need to entrust those who wear the uniform of the Army and Armada an efficient way to prevent sullying the 
most appreciated of its emblems.  
These were authorized to judge “all behaviour […] which, in the opinion of the military 
community, sullies the good name or chivalry of its authors” (Article 2). If the Court of 
Honour considers it dishonourable, it will propose separation from the service (Article 6).  
 
6. The Law on Political Responsibilities 
The Law of  9 February 1939, on Political Responsibilities, was set “to settle the [political] 
guilt of those who performed grave actions or omissions in order to create the Red subversion, 
to keep it alive for over two years and to hinder the fortunate and historically inevitable 
triumph of the National Uprising” (Preface). It is a sui generis responsibility, for the types and 
range of sanctions, as the Preface recognises:  
The purposes of this Act and its development go beyond the strict concepts of a penal norm pressed in 
expired moulds. The intentional magnitude and the material consequences of the affronts inflicted on Spain are 
such that no punishment or repair would be adequate. But our National Revolution desires neither suffering nor 
cruelty nor taking poverty into homes. 
The following actions are susceptible, for example, to political responsibility (Art. 4): 
having been condemned for the crimes of Rebellion or treason, having held management 
positions in (or be linked to) illegal parties or groups, 
31having been put forward for positions 
of trust for the government of the Popular Front, having spoken publicly in defence of the said 
Front, having belonged to the Masonic Lodge, having actively opposed the National Uprising, 
etc. 
There were three types of sanctions: unable to work (absolute or special disqualification), 
restriction of abode (deportation abroad, deportation to the Spanish territories in Africa, 
confinement or exile) financial (total loss of assets, payment of a fixed quantity or loss of 
certain assets) and exceptionally, the loss of Spanish nationality.  
Likewise, special jurisdiction of political responsibilities is created. This is made up of 
the following organs: Regional Courts  of Political Responsibilities; a National Court of 
Political Responsibilities,
32 that resolves the appeals against those courts; some provincial 
                                                           
31 The Law on Political Responsibilities sets and gives a detailed list of the groups and associations which were 
already declared illegal in virtue of Decree 13 of September 1936 (above). 
32 This Court was under the authority of the Vice -President of the Government, integrated by a President, two 
generals or military of the Army or Armada, two National Ministers of the Traditionalist Spanish Falangist 
Movement and JONS (who must be lawyers) a nd two Magistrates of at least Magistrate Court level, all freely 
proposed by the Government (art. 19). The President will be the Superior Administrative Head of Political 
Responsibilities. These Headquarters aimed, amongst other duties, to occupy, adminis ter, make an inventory, 
transfer goods seized from the mentioned institutions, associations or parties which were declared illegal ( art. 
23). The Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (JONS) was a political movement of fascist ideology founded 9 
Prosecution Courts, that collect evidence and specify charges. Finally, a Special Civil Court is 
assigned to each of the Regional Courts. It deals with matters of the assets of accused people. 
Its resolutions can be appealed before the corresponding Provincial Court.    
 
7. The Law on Repression of Masonry and Communism   
The  Law  of  1  March  1940  creates  the  crime  of  belonging  to  the  Masonic  Lodge  and 
Communism and dissolves and prohibits all its organisations, branches or auxiliary nuclei. 
The Law tries to justify it given their “perniciousness”. These groups are considered a leading 
factor in the decadence of Spain and they are attributed, amongst other things, the revolutions 
of the 19th century, the fall of the monarchy as well as many state crimes. According to the 
Preface: 
These serious crimes imposed on the greatness and well-being of the Nation were worsened during the last 
decade and culminated in the terrible atheist, materialist anti-military and anti Spanish campaign which made our 
Spain a satellite and slave of the Soviet criminal tyranny. 
The punishment imposed on Masons or Communists (Art 5) is imprisonment (from 12 
years and a day to 20 years), unless there are aggravating circumstances,
33 in which case 
longer imprisonment will be given (from 20 years and a day to 30 years).
34 
Likewise, those who prior to the publication of this Law, had belonged to the Mas onic 
Lodge or Communism must provide the Government with a retraction, within 2 months from 
the fact being known as well as any pertinent circumstances (Art. 7).
35  If no excuse is 
recognised,
36  they  are  definitively  removed  from  any  State  post,  public  and  of ficial 
Corporations, subsidised institutions and concessionary firms, managerial posts and boards of 
directors of private firms as well as positions of trust (command or management) of these. 
Perpetual  disqualification  and  confinement  or  expulsion  is  order ed  for  these  workers. 
Likewise, they will be submitted to imposition of economic sanction in accordance with the 
Law of 9 February 1939. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
in 1931. In 1934 it joined Falange Española (FE), of a similar ideology, created in 1933 by José Antonio Primo 
de Rivera and others. In 1937, Franco united FE-JONS and the other political and paramilitary bastion of the 
National  Movement,  Carlism,  which  was  of  a  traditionalist  ideology  (non  fascist)  from  which  resulted  the 
Traditional Spanish Falangist Movement.  
33  Aggravating circumstances in the Masonic qualification are, e.g.: having obtained one of the grades from 18 to 
33 or having taken part in the assemblies of International Masonic association or in national assemblies. And, as 
regards communists, being “in the leadership of agitation, in Headquarters and connection core groups linked 
with foreign organisations and having participated actively in national or foreign communist congresses” (Art. 
6.). 
34 As a matter of fact, there were few people condemned for communism by this Court as there were other 
oppressor formulas for its repression.  See Raúl Cancio,  Guerra civil y tribunales populares: de los jurados 
populares a la justicia franquista (1936-1939) [Civil War and popular juries: from popular juries to Franco 
justice (1936-1939)], Cáceres, 2007, 160. 
35 The details of this are regulated in Decree 30 March 1940. 
36 See Art. 10 10 
The  Courts  of  Honour  were  responsible  for  finding  these  facts  in  the  case  of  Army 
officials. For others, a special Court was created “headed by that who designed the Head of 
State and a General of the Army, a leader of the Traditionalist Spanish Falangist Movement 
and JONS and two lawyers”.
37 
 
8. General Trial for crimes committed during “Red Domination”  
In virtue of Decree 26 April 1940, the Government ordered the Public Prosecutor of the 
Supreme  Court  to  “instruct  a  general  trial  which  reunites  the  proof  of  criminal  actions 
committed  on  the  entire  national  territory  during  red  domination”  (art.  1).  This  meant 
providing all the authorities and civil and military corporations with all the help needed. With 
this trial, it is expected to elucidate (Preface): 
[…] from the preparatory acts of subversion to the final behaviour of the defeated leaders and to investigate 
the causes and effects of the crime, the procedures used in its execution, the attribution of responsibilities, the 
identification of victims and the determination of the material and moral damage caused against people or assets, 
as well as against Religion, Culture, Art and national Patrimony. 
 
9. The Court of Public Order  
The Act of 2 December 1963 created the Court and Tribunal of Public Order —the Court for 
preliminary  investigations  into  cases.  Exclusive  competence  was  granted  on  the  entire 
national territory to prosecute for the crimes which were “singled out for a low or high level 
of  severity  in  subverting  the  basic  principles  of  the  State,  perturbing  the  public  order  or 
spreading  confusion  in  national  conscience”  (Preface).  It  had  also  competence  on  crimes 
typified  in  the  Act  of  1  March  1940.  These  were  crimes  of  repression  of  masonry  and 
communism, after the abolition of the special corresponding Court (final Resolution 4). It 
specifically had competence on crimes against the Head of State, the Parliament, the Council 
of  Ministers  and  the  Form  of  Government;  rebellion,  sedition,  public  disorder,  illegal 
propaganda and illegal detention for political or social motives” (Art. 3). 
 
10. The Crime of Rebellion  
The most serious crimes were those of Rebellion. Until 1945, this crime was regulated by the 
code of Military Justice approved by the Royal Decree of 24 September 1890.
38 The crime of 
                                                           
37 See Art. 9. 
38 See Oscar Vergara, La Ley de Memoria Histórica: ¿cuentas pendientes?  Sobre la revisión judicial de las 
condenas por motivos políticos o sin las debidas garantías durante la Guerra civil y la Dictadura [The Remaining 
Accounts of (Spanish) Historical Memory Law: On Judicial Review of Sentences Passed by Political Reasons or 
without Due Process of Law during Spanish Civil War and Dictatorship], Justicia, 2011, 188-190, for detailed 
information on this theme. 11 
Rebellion consists of rising up against the State or its legitimate authorities. However, in 
virtue of the Decree of 24 July 1936
39 , all the powers of State are taken by the Junta of 
National Defence and legitimate authorities become those of the Uprising. In its original 
edition of 1890, Art 237 of the Code of Military Justice defines the crime of rebellion as the 
following: 
Offenders of the crime of military rebellion are those who raise arms against the Constitution of the State, 
against  the  King,  Co-legislative  Bodies  or  the  legitimate  Government,  providing  that  one  of  the  following 
circumstances occur: 
1. that these are ordered by the military or that the uprising is started, sustained or is aided by the Army.  
2. that it forms a military organised group of 10 or more individuals.  
3. that it forms a group of under 10, if in a certain territory of the Nation there are other groups of the Army 
before or after having declared the state of War. 
As regards punishment, the most serious was death which could be administered to the 
Head of the Rebellion and to those who command the different units. For the rest, such as 
those  who  supported  rebellion,  the  punishment  varied  from  life  imprisonment  to  death. 
Nevertheless, during the Civil War, the Ban of 28 July 1936 of the Junta of National Defence 
extended  the  offences  types  of  the  crimes  of  rebellion,  as  well  as  those  considered 
responsible.  
There is no legal reform of the Code of Military Justice in this subject until 1943, in 
virtue  of  the  Act  of  2  March  1943,  which  restricts  the  modifications  established  in  the 
Military Bans from 1936. In 1945, a new Code of Military Justice was promulgated in virtue 
of the Act of 17 July 1945, which substitutes that of 1890. Art 286 establishes:  
Offenders  of  the  crime  of  military  rebellion  are  those  who  raise  arms  against  the  Head  of  State,  its 
Government or fundamental Institutions of the Nation, providing that one of the following circumstances occur: 
1. that these are ordered by the military or that the uprising is started, sustained or is aided by the Army.  
2. that it forms a military organised group of 10 or more individuals.  
3. that it forms a group of fewer than 10, if in a certain territory of the nation there are other groups or 
forces which set themselves the same objectives.  
4. that it harasses the forces of the Army  
5. that offenders of the crime of military rebellion are also those who are declared as such in special Laws 
or in bans of military authorities. 
As regards punishment, death was imposed to those who head the Rebellion. Article 287 
states: 
The Head of the Rebellion will be punished with the death penalty as will he who heads the rebel forces or 
elements.  
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Rebels who lead Companies and analogous superior of any of the three Armies will also be punished by 
the death penalty. 
Those  not  principally  in  charge  and  mere  executors  are  punished  (article  288)  with 
imprisonment of 12 years and a day to death “which the Court will apply discretionally”. The 
same punishment will be given to promoters and co-operators as well as those who join the 
Rebellion with actions which signify impulse, promotion, help or support (art 288.2). Those 
who help the Rebellion without identifying with it are given a six month and one day prison 
sentence (art 289). The same punishment will be given to those who incite the Rebellion, even 
if it doesn’t occur, and those who, once the crime has been perpetrated, justify it (article 290). 
Conspirators will also be imprisoned (art. 291). 
The  military  jurisdiction  was  competent  on  the  crime  of  Rebellion  in  all  its  forms, 
according to the summary proceedings in the corresponding Council of War. Both the Code 
of 1890 and that of 1945 showed a more than trifling catalogue of procedural safeguards.
40 
 
III. Towards a material Theory of legal system 
11. Legitimacy of the legal order and its norms  
From the above, two conclusions can be taken: 
1. As has been already said, every legal order harbours a “claim to correctness” (Alexy): 
in this case, the mentioned norms respond clearly to a certain conception of State and the 
common good, which is imposed coercively upon a pernicious political concept.  
2. The justification of the legal order is moral in nature
41 – it can only be thus. As Nino 
shows, the recognition of the norms dictated by a de facto regime cannot base itself on the 
fact that they have been set by those who exert power. This implies a fallacy, which is an 
illegitimate jump from is to ought. 
42 
However, the justification of the norms of a legal order  de iure is the same. As the 
Argentinean  professor  pointed  out,  “showing  consistency  between  these  norms  and  a 
constitution seems a valid foundation purely because it assumes acceptable ethical values”.
43  
Kelsen  tries  to  avoid  this  conclusion,  resorting  to  a  presupposed  —or  fictitious
44—  
fundamental norm
45 which sometimes he identifies with the norm of international Law which 
                                                           
40 Vergara (note 38), 188-190; 210-211. 
41 Carlos S. Nino, Derecho, moral y política [Moral and Political Law], Barcelona, 1994, 58-59. 
42 Carlos S. Nino, La validez del derecho [The Validity of Law], Buenos Aires, 1985, 92. 
43 Ibidem. 
44 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen [General Theory of Norms], K. Ringhofer and R. Walter, ed., 
Vienna, 1979, 206. 
45 Kelsen (note 23), 209. 13 
confers validity to the various legal orders in its scope.
46 But this is problematic, because what 
gives validity or binding force (in Kelsen it is the same) to International Law?  
Bulygin considers that the question of obligation is a moral one, totally unsuitable in a 
positivist approach. Validity implies direct or indirect recognition for the final rule of a 
system which has a conceptual, but not moral character: It defines what rules form part of it 
but does not aim to confer obligation.
47 Ross has qualified Kelsen’s pure theory as “quasi 
positivism”.
48 For Olivecrona, the notion of binding force of law is just an empty word with 
an emotional meaning.
49 
Nino distinguishes between two types of legitimacy of legal norms  —those that refer to 
its origin and those that refer to its content. In his view, when a norm fully satisfies the 
demands of content, the question of origin becomes superfluous. However, when this is not 
the case, the considerations about its origin become relevant. For this reason, the origin of 
norms must be legitimate, so norms whose contents branched off into reasonable margins 
must be obligatory, from the substantive demands of justice which, on the other hand, is 
inevitable given the tendency of man to fall into moral errors.
50 
For Nino, the superiority of democracy, as decision making system, lies in its ability to 
be the best substitute for moral discourse. It allows fulfilling in a high grade the demands of 
free deliberation and consensus. In moral discourse, its rules constitute the outcomes of it. 
This constitutive character transfer to democratic process, but restrictedly. Its justificatory 
capacity is prima facie.
51 It is possible to bring into question those decisions that would not 
have been taken in a genuine moral discourse. These diversions are inacceptable when they 
imply to destroy the preconditions that make this discourse subsist. This justifies democracy 
being limited by a set of basic rights. In Nino’s opinion, the goal of promoting individual 
rights is what supports the existence of a Government. If it is democratic, it is backed by the 
presumption of correctness of the means for that end.
52 
The rules of autocratic origin lack this presumption of justice. This is not to say that their 
content can not be just and that they can not be morally compulsory. Is there any possibility of 
setting the validity of these rules attending to their origin? Nino criticizes the argument that 
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51 Unlike Raz, who considered it exclusionary, see above the Section “1. Legal order and the legal system”. 
52 Nino (note 42), 97. 14 
says: it is better some government rather than no government, because it does not necessarily 
grant the human rights. Nevertheless, Nino thinks, once de facto authority holds the power, if 
it is not possible to restore the democracy, a widespread disobedience can be too onerous in 
terms of preservation of rights: “So, if de facto authorities are respectful with basic rights, 
there are moral considerations of order, peace, security, etc., in favour of its rules. They have 
some weight and they have to be weighed basically by judges, considering their possible 
diversion from justice [...]”.
53 
This weight of origin of the rules of a de facto government is lower than that of the rules 
of  a  democratic  government  because  those  rules  lack  the  presumption  of  justice.  This 
involves, as we will see in the Spanish case, that order, peace and security are reasons that can 
only be fully argued while the de facto regime is in force. When it is replaced, it is not so 
onerous  to  disregard  its  rules.  Nevertheless,  those  values  still  operate  in  some  aspects, 
regarding norms that have generated vested rights, expectations and consolidated situations. 
Reverting from those situations could generate great legal insecurity.
54 
According to what has been said, for Nino, legal validity is gradual. It is higher when the 
origin of rules is of a democratic character, because it supposes justice. If it is not the  case, 
there is still some grade of validity, on the basis of considerations of order and security. But 
these are not decisive when a democratic regimen comes after. In this case, autocratic rules 
can be easily overtaken by value considerations if they do not gravely affect legal security, as 
we will see it happens in the Spanish case. 
 
12. Revision of pre-constitutional right 
Curiously, the Transition to democracy does not establish a new legal order in the terms 
analyzed in § 1, because it does not involve a new rule of recognition, but the transformation 
of the Francoist regime by itself. Formally, a new chain of validity is not established. The 
reform of the regime starts from a “Ley Fundamental” (Fundamental Act), correctly emanated 
from the Francoist Legislative Assembly: The Political Reform Act (Nr. 1/1977, January 4
th) 
(PRA). This Act requires the Government to call the first democratic election. As a result of 
this, the Amnesty Act of 1977 and the Constitution of 1978 are developed and sanctioned. 
This democratic Constitution recognizes a set of fundamental rights, considered as the basis 
of  the  political  order,  and  confers  to  the  Parliament  the  power  to  enact  laws,  which  are 
sanctioned  by  the  King.  But  those  three  aspects  —democracy,  fundamental  rights  and 
legislative process— were yet provided by PRA in its first article. To speak about a new legal 
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order is only possible on the basis of material or content considerations. But the material 
transformation  itself  is  previous  to  the  Constitution  of  1978  and  it  is  generated  by  the 
Francoist Regime itself by the PRA. Anyway, formally the legal order is not changed. There 
is not breakup. It is necessary to attend to the content of preconstitutional rules in order to 
determine if they are or not conflicting with the Constitution. Its 3
rd Transitional Rule abolish 
all the rules that are conflicting with the Constitution. Finally, the own constitutional reform 
process, that culminates in the Constitution of 1978, is specifically provided in the PRA (3
rd 
article). 
It  is  obvious  that  the  repressive  right  of  Dictatorship  is  not  compatible  with  the 
Constitutional right. The Courts of Honour are specifically forbidden; one cannot establish 
sanctions for political or ideological reasons; nobody can be prosecuted for being a mason or 
communist and nobody can be given the death penalty for rebellion (currently not even in 
times of War). There is no doubt that these regulations violate fundamental rights such as 
ideological liberty, freedom of opinion, freedom of association, religious freedom, the right to 
honour and the right to the free development of personality etc.  
However  the  Spanish  Constitution  (SC)  abrogates  (but  does  not  annul)  laws  where 
repression was legally founded. This means that if there is not a legal requirement which 
specifically states it, the sanctions imposed by virtue of the repressive Law are still valid. 
From the Transition to the present day, the legislator has tried to mitigate their effects by 
economic and moral reparations to those who suffered from them. Moreover, a big effort has 
been made in order to compensate the damages and prejudicial consequences derived from the 
civil conflict; specifically those suffered in the most basic areas as a consequence of the War: 
life, health, physical integrity etc.  
At first, the reparations tended towards the rehabilitation of the civil servants and to the 
recognition of their passive rights. This coincided with granting Amnesty for the crimes and 
misdemeanours of political intent. Gradually, a series of pensions were granted to those who 
were disabled because of the War as well as to the families of the deceased and missing. 
Later, those who suffered prison for political reasons were compensated and a pension was 
given  to  the  so-called  “Children  of  the  War”. Nationality  was  also  given  to  members  of 
International  brigades.  Finally,  the  Historical  Memory  Act  has  completed  the  reparatory 
panorama from a financial, but especially moral, point of view. We will look at this in more 
detail in the following paragraphs. 
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IV. Reparations from Transition 
13. Amnesty for crimes and misdemeanours of political intent  
One of the government’s first measures during the Transition was the revision ex officio and 
cancelling the effects of administrative sanctions imposed to civil servants of the State by 
virtue of the Law on Political Responsibilities, 10 February 1939.
55  
So, Royal Decree Law 10/1976, 30 July aims to achieve the “national reconciliation” 
because  it  considers  “the  moment  has  arrived  to  finalise  this  process  by  forgetting  any 
discriminatory  legacy  of  the  past”.  For  this,  it  granted  Amnesty  for  all  the  crimes  and 
misdemeanours of political intent and opinion, providing that they had not harmed or placed 
in  danger
56  the  life  or  integrity  of  people  or  the  nation’s  economic  patrimony  through 
monetary fraud. Amnesty covers the crimes of rebellion and sedition and includes deserters, 
fugitives and conscientious objectors.
57  
But the Parliament went much further than Government in virtue of Law 46/1977, 15 
October, by granting amnesty to all acts of political intent (regardless of the result) which 
were classified as crimes and misdemeanours carried out before 15 December 1976.
58 It is 
important to note that oblivion applied to all, not only for the prisoners of ETA (for whom this 
measure of grace was especially conceived), but also the crimes and misdemeanours which 
the authorities, civil servants and public order agents could have committed with the motive 
of investigation and persecution of the acts included in this Act.  
 
14. Reinstatement of civil servants  
a) As regards civil servants who had lost their jobs as a consequence of their acts of political 
intent, the Royal  Decree Law 10/1976 (Art. 9) and the  Amnesty Act (Art. 7)
 stipulated their 
reinstatement into service. Nevertheless, they could only receive income for the time they had 
worked. Their time away from the civil service counted as seniority.  
 
b) At first the professional military had no right to be re-instated into their jobs and careers 
even  if  they  had  received  income  in  accordance  with  the  post  they  had  had  when  they 
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56 Royal  Decree 19/1977, of 14 March, eliminated the clause “placed in danger”.   
57  Decree 1081/1978, 2 May specifies some aspects of the Royal Decree -Law 10/1976 regarding the civil 
servants of the Government of Cataluña. 
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for re-establishing public liberties or the Spanish Peoples claim for autonomy”. The date was extended to 6 
October 1977 if actions had not meant serious violence against people’s lives or integrity. 17 
committed  the  forgiven  crime  (articles  8  and  6  respectively).
59  Later, Law 37/1984, 22 
October, stipulated retirement for those soldiers with retirement inherent rights and with a 
position which they would have had if they had remained in service. Finally, Law 24/1986, 24 
December, established that professional soldiers could also request to be reinstated to the 
position that corresponded to their seniority.  
 
c) As regards the non-professional military, the afore-mentioned Law 37/1984 recognised 
“rendered services” to  all personnel  “who had entered the service of the Republic in  the 
Armed Forces and had obtained a position or grade of at least NCO during the period from 18 
July 1936 to 1 April 1939”, as well as those who, over the same period, had entered the 
service of the Republic as members of Forces of the Public Order or the Carabinero Corps.
60 
These people are also granted the right to a pension as well as medicine and social services in 
the same measure as pensioners receiving Social Security. It also grants surviving spouses and 
orphans rights to a widow/ orphan’s pension as well as the other services mentioned. 
 
d)  As  well  as  this,  specific  requirements  of  reinstatement  were  established  for  local 
administration civil servants,
61 as well as civil servants working in the justice department ,
62 
primary school teachers from the Professional Plan of 1931
63 and  primary school teachers 
from the Primary Stage of 1936.
64 
 
15. Those wounded and disabled by the War  
 Decree 670/1976, 5 March, grants a pension to all those who suffered wounds which led to a 
significant  reduction in their faculties as a direct or indirect consequence of War actions 
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62 Royal Decree-Law 44/1978, 21 December. 
63 Royal Decree1555 /1977, 2 June. 
64 Royal Decree 329/1979, 13 February. 18 
developed on the National territory between 18 July 1936 and 1 April 1939. They could not 
enter the Body of Knights Disabled by War for the Country.  
Some problems affecting those disabled in this period were left unresolved and these 
were  addressed  in  Royal  Decree  Law  43/1978,  21  December.  This  Decree  distinguished 
between those disabled in action, those who became disabled during their service and those 
who were unable to work. It granted those of the first degree, as well as those who were unfit 
for work the right to a basic pension as well as a disabled pension for their families.
65  
We  recall  that  the  Royal  Decree  Law  6/1978,  6  March,  stated  the  pension  for 
professional soldiers, as well as for their widows and orphans. Royal Decree Law 46/1978, 21 
December, moreover gave them the right to a life pens ion for having suffered, during the 
Civil War, wounds or lesions which had led to notable reduction of their faculties.  
At first there was no distinction between Republican and national fighters. The latter had 
been compensated although there were a small  number of them who had not been able to 
access the corresponding protector norms
66 or who had opted to exercise better rights. Law 
35/1980, 26 June,
67  was aimed specifically at those disabled and invalid soldiers of the 
Republican area,
68 considering that the previous regulation was susceptible to improvement.   
Finally, Law 6/1982, 29 March, was aimed at civilians left disabled because of War, 
establishing basic retribution for those as well as a pension and the possibility to claim Social 
Security as well as other rights.   
 
16. Deaths due to the Civil War  
 Law 5/1979, 18 September, grants pensions to widows, children and other relatives of those 
deceased during (or as a consequence of) the Civil War as well as of those missing in action at 
the Front or elsewhere if it can be presumed they died by those motives. As well as (life) 
pensions,  they have right  to  medical/pharmaceutical  assistance and  certain social  services 
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66 These are: Law of 15 September 1932; Law of 12 December 1942; Law of 26 December 1958; Law 5/1976, 
11 March. 
67 The Royal  Decree-Law 391/1982, de 12 de February integrates in the General Regime of Social Security 
disabled ex servicemen of the Republican area. They are entitled to healthcare and social services.   
68  This  refers  specifically  to  all  those  “Spaniard  ex-combatants  of  the  Republican  area  who,  by  belonging 
permanently or incidentally to the Armies, Forces of Public Order (of a military nature) or collaborating with 
these under the orders of natural command had suffered wounds which affected permanently their physical or 
psychological integrity”. This also applied to those “who suffered incapacity due to illnesses which began or 
worsened in service during the period between 18 July 1936 and 1 April 1939, or from captivity suffered as a 
direct consequence of War actions over that period”.  19 
such  as  Access  to  the  Residences  and  Homes  of  the  Social  Service  of  Assistance  to 
Pensioners.
69 
 
17. Compensation for deprivation of liberty for political reasons  
Amnesty meant the end of limitations and suspension for many Spaniards as regards their 
active  and  passive  rights.  However,  it  did  not  solve  the  problem  of  the  lack  of  social 
protection which affected many people, who, due to their stay in prison, could not reap Social 
Security benefits. Law 18/1984, 8 June, completed the Amnesty Act to “eliminate the final 
obstacles to integrate (as citizens with full rights) those who fought for liberty and peaceful 
co-existence in Spain”.
70 This Act recognises the effects of Social Security contributions and 
the periods spent in prison as a consequence of the cases stated in the Amnesty Act. 
Likewise, Law 4/1990, 29 June, Additional Norm 18, of the General State Budget for 
1990, established compensation for those who had suffered prison for the same motives stated 
in  the  Amnesty  Act  for  three  years  or  more.
71  The  surviving  spouse  received  the 
compensation if her spouse had died and if he was 65 by 31 December 1990.
72  
For the many people who did not fulfi l these requisites, almost all the autonomous 
communities have enacted specific norms, recognising a right to compensation.
73 
 
18. Returning assets to political parties and Trade Unions  
a) The Law 4/1986, 8 January freely gives Trade Unions and business organisations the assets 
of the Accumulated Trade Union Patrimony (Patrimony of the State) and gives back the assets 
of  the  Historical  Trade  Union  Patrimony  to  Trade  Unions  who  can  prove  they  are  the 
legitimate successors of those who suffered confiscation,
74  (providing that assets had not 
passed to third parties or had not undergone substantial alterations which prevented them 
                                                           
69 This Law  was developed by the Royal Decree 2635/1979, 16 November. The Resolution of the General 
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73 In short, according to the Inter-ministerial Commission, approximately 574,000 applications had been resolved 
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74 In virtue of this, we recall the Decree of 13 September 1936 and the Law on Political Responsibilities 1939.  20 
from  being  integrated  with  original  assets).  In  this  case,  the  State  was  obliged  to  give 
compensation for their value.  
Despite this, almost twenty years later, it has not been possible to give back the assets of 
the Historical Union Patrimony, mainly due to the demands that Law 4/1986 set as regards 
crediting ownerships. These demands did not take into account the existence of a Civil War 
followed by a long period of Dictatorship. The Royal Decree Law 13/2005, 28 October tried 
to solve this problem by establishing a deadline (31 January 2006) —which the Act had not 
done,  with  the  consequent  perjury  of  legal  security.  It  also  updates  the  criteria  for 
compensation of assets, that the Law 4/1986 set around the market value in 1986. 
 
b) Law 43/1998, 15 November, did the same with political parties, stipulating the restitution 
to those mentioned in the Law 9 February 1939
75 of property assets  and patrimonial rights 
which they had owned and which had been seized even if they had not have legal status. In 
those cases in which these goods or rights could not be totally or partially returned (as they 
had not been sufficiently identified or for belo nging to third parties, or for being public 
property or for any other reason), the monetary (market) value would be given.   
With  regard  to  the  individuals,  the  evident  technical  difficulties
76  have  prevented 
providing legal measures to return them goods and patrimonial assets. To this, the demand for 
legal security of Article 9.3 of the SC can be added, taking into account the quantity of legal 
transactions linked to such goods and rights in the last 70 years. 
 
19. Granting Spanish nationality to members of International Brigades  
Article 21.1 of the Civil Code states “Spanish nationality is acquired by naturalisation papers, 
granted  discretionally  by  Royal  Decree  when  there  are  exceptional  circumstances  for  the 
interested party”. Royal Decree 39/1996, 19 January, considers that voluntary members of the 
International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939 are indeed in those 
exceptional circumstances. However since Article 23 of the Civil Code demanded that former 
nationality be renounced, many members simply  requested a  certificate from  the General 
Management of Registrars and Notaries which stated the faculty to exercise this right.  
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20. The “Children of War”  
As  people  know,  many  children  were  evacuated  during  the  Civil  War,  being  mainly 
welcomed (in Europe) in Belgium, the UK, France, the former Czechoslovakia and the former 
URSS. As regards America, they were sent to Mexico, Venezuela and Chile. Law 3/2005 of 
18 March recognises an economic assistance to those who, being minors, were sent abroad 
and spent most of their life outside the national territory.  The norm is aimed specifically for 
those with smaller incomes, i.e. to those who had to accept old age pensions in favour of 
Spanish immigrants (purely to survive) and specific retirement pensions addressed to those 
who did not contribute to Social Security.
77 
 
21. The  Historical Memory Act 
The Law 52/2007, of 26 December, which recognises and enhances the rights and establishes 
measures in favour of those who suffered persecution or violence during the Civil War and 
the Dictatorship (HMA), was the culmination of this reparatory process which started during 
the Transition (and which we have reviewed in brief). It looks specifically at the honorary and 
moral aspects which had not been done beforehand and it introduces improvements as regards 
pensions.  
 
a) As regards the former, an “individual right to the personal and family memory of each 
citizen”  is  recognised.  The  unjust  character  of  each  form  of  persecution  for  political, 
ideological or religious reasons is stated. The illegitimacy of the organs created during the 
Civil War is declared as well as the sanctions and condemnations they set.
78 The right to 
obtain an administrative Declaration of redress and personal recognition to those who suffered 
from the effects of said resolutions is granted. Public administrations are forced to collaborate 
with individuals in finding and identifying victims. They are also told to remove all  those 
symbols which exalt (individually or collectively) the military uprising, the Civil War or 
Dictatorship.
79  As regards the Valle de los Caídos (Valley of the Fallen),
80  all types of 
political or actions that exalt the Civil War, its protagonists or Fran coism are forbidden. The 
Government also has to carry out a census of buildings and work done by Members of the 
                                                           
77The quantity is the difference between 6,090 Euros and the annual amount received for such pensions. 
78 The Historical Memory Act does not cancel such resolutions. Despite  this, there are those who wrongly think 
that this is possible through the appeal for review in the Supreme Court. See Vergara, (note 38), passim. 
79  Exceptions are private memorabilia or when there are artistic, architectonic or artistic -religious reasons 
protected by the Law.   
80 This is a monument which commemorates those fallen in The Civil War between 1940 and 1958, where, 
amongst other tens of thousands of both camps, are buried Franco and Primo de Rivera. 22 
Disciplinary Battalions of Working Soldiers as well as by prisoners of concentration camps, 
Battalions of workers and prisoners in Military colonial prisons. The Spanish nationality is 
granted to volunteers of the International Brigades, but now without having to renounce their 
previous nationality.
81 The Documentary Centre of Historical Memory is (re)created.
82 
 
b) But the Law also introduces improvements in financial benefits. 
1) Those who died because of the Civil War: There was a problem with the beneficiaries of 
those who had died as a result of  the Civil War, but after the two years deadline set by the 
Law 5/1979, September 18.
83 In order to grant them a pension, the HMA only demands that 
wounds which cause death are a consequence of the Civil War, without setting time limits.   
Likewise, the afore-mentioned Law 5/1979 recognised that widows, children and fathers 
of those who had died during the Civil War were entitled to a pension. This had to be “as a 
consequence of political or Trade Union actions  or opinions,  when a direct  and personal 
relation of causality between the Civil War and death could be established and whereby this 
had  not  been  the  consequence  of  a  sentence,  nor  derived  from  the  violent  action  of  the 
interested party”. Then the HMA removed the clause “and whereby this had not been the 
consequence of a sentence, nor derived from the violent action of the interested party”.
84  
Finally, as regards this very same Law, as well as Law 35/1980, 26 June, from 1981, 
orphans had seen their pensions frozen. Therefore the HMA set this as 132.86 Euros a month 
and ensures this will be re-valued periodically.   
 
2) Beneficiaries of the Amnesty Act: As regards Law 4/1990, 29 June, of the General State 
Budget for 1990, whose Additional Norm 18 granted compensation in favour of those who 
suffered prison as a consequence of the cases stated in the Amnesty Act,
85  the HMA modifies 
this Additional Norm 18, including in it members of the Disciplinary Battalions (who had 
been excluded). Likewise, it reduces the age required: from 65 to 60 on 31 December 1990, 
for a right to compensation. It also establishes new compensation for the spouse when the 
                                                           
81 See above the Section “19. Granting Spanish Nationality to members of International Brigades”. 
82 Its functions are, amongst others: a) maintain and develop the General Archives of the Spanish Civil War of 
Salamanca; b) recuperate and ensure that documents and secondary sources are available to interested parties 
(the same Law grants specifically an access right); c) promote historical  research of the Civil War, etc. This 
organ had previously been created in virtue of Royal Decree 697/2007, 1 June. 
83 See above “16. Deaths due to the Civil War”.  
84 To complete this, Law 5/1979 considered that those who had died after the Civil War due to a sentence, 
violent action or a situation of deprivation of liberty due to their participation in the War, were entitled to 
benefits.  
85 See above the Section “17. Compensation for deprivation of liberty for political reasons”. 23 
deceased had been condemned to death and executed even if he had not served the three years 
in prison.
86 
Fiscal benefits are also included.  In connection with the Royal  Legislative Decree 
3/2004, 5 March that approves the Refunded Text of the Income Tax Act, artic le 7 states the 
exemption of certain income. The HMA exempts, with effect from 2005, the compensations 
granted by the State and the Autonomous Communities to repair those who were deprived of 
their liberty for reasons considered in the Amnesty Act. Likewis e, it establishes a set of 
measures destined to compensate the tax burdens of compensations received since 1 January 
1999 for the same motives.  
Finally, there is a specific recognition, both moral and financial, of those “people who 
died defending democracy between 1 January 1968 and 6 October 1977”. Its beneficiaries
87 
are given the right to compensation of 135,000 Euros. 
 
V. Conclusions and bibliography 
22. Conclusions 
1) The triumph of the military uprising of 18 July 1936 set a new legal order which radically 
changed the chain of validity of legal norms (§§1-2). This was not the case in the subsequent 
Transition  to  Democracy  in  the  70’s,  because  it  consisted  in  the  transformation  of  the 
Francoist regime from itself (§12). 
 
2) Formally, all the legal orders harbour an identical claim to correctness (§§4-10). 
 
3) The traditional vision of the positivist theories of the legal system does not allow one to 
discriminate between legal orders as regards legitimacy, which is a moral question (§§2-3).  
 
4) In such a way (formally) we can not distinguish between the Dictatorship and the new 
democratic Regime. But we can do it on the basis of their respective contents. Particularly, 
regarding the respective grade of respect that they embody for human rights. 
 
5) Partly for that reason, a democratic legal order and an autocratic one must be distinguished 
on  the  base  of  the  presumption  of  justice  of  the  former.  Democracy,  as  public  decision 
making system, is a better substitute of the decision making system of the genuine moral 
                                                           
86 In the case that they had not received a pension or compensation charged to one of the public systems of social 
protection. According to the 2007 edition, compensation rose to €.9,616.18  
87 These are the children, the spouse or partner and parents, siblings and children of the surviving person.  24 
discourse (Nino). Nevertheless, this justification is only prima facie, as this system does not 
guarantee the infallibility of decisions. Likewise, the norms of an autocratic system can be 
valid for reasons of order and security when there is respect for basic rights although these 
reasons do not operate fully once the transition to a democratic system has been made (§11). 
The fundamental criteria are that of justice and, secondarily, that of security. 
 
6) The criteria to weigh up the justice and injustice of legal requirements, (as well as legal 
orders) come from the degree of respect shown towards human rights. If these have been 
harmed,  they  must  be  repaired.  This  is  the  sense  of  the  numerous  financial  and  moral 
measures adopted since the Transition in relation to the effects of the Civil War and the later 
repression, as a consequence of loss of life, freedom or health, having been sanctioned for 
political or ideological reasons, having suffered exile or the loss of one’s assets, etc. — all 
this to the extent that the legal security allows it (§§13-21). 
 
7) Finally, one must take into account the fact that the Spanish Constitution, with its catalogue 
of fundamental rights, was not in force at the moment of its violation, but this did not prevent 
it from making the mentioned reparations. What it does is to recognise human rights, not 
grant or bestow them.  
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